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MISSOURI APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
IN CIVIL CASES
WALTER E. BENNICKt
Upon being told that he was suffering from hardening of the
arteries, an inquisitive patient asked the doctor when the process
had begun. The doctor replied that it had actually started on
the day of the patient's birth.
So it is with any consideration of the subject of appellate
practice and procedure. The case reviewed in the appellate
court is necessarily the one tried to a final conclusion in the trial
court. It is regarded in the appellate court upon the same theory
as that adopted by the parties in the court below. The whole
purpose of the appeal is to determine whether reversible error
was committed at any stage of the trial below. Consequently
any discussion of appellate practice and procedure cannot prop-
erly be limited to the period following the filing of the transcript
in the appellate court, or even to the period following the giving
of notice of appeal in the trial court, but instead must revert
back to the very institution of the action when the first opportu-
nity for error was presented.
PRESERVATION IN TRIAL COURT OF POINTS FOR REvIEW
It is thus to be seen that an appellate court, when exercising
its appellate jurisdiction, is purely a court of review, which
means that for it to be put in a position where it may determine
whether error was committed by the lower court, the appellant,
generally speaking, must not only have presented the matter of
which he complains to the lower court for its decision, but he
must also have preserved his objection to the adverse ruling
in such a way as to entitle the appellate court to act upon it.
Even in the class of cases which are said to be triable de novo
on appeal, the appellate court acts none the less in the same
limited capacity, and is precluded from considering any matter
which should have been, but was not, made a ground of the
motion for a new trial, where such a motion was required for
preserving matters for appellate review.
But as in the case of most rules, this one likewise has its
t Presiding Judge, St. Louis Court of Appeals.
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exceptions, which are to be found enumerated in Mo. SUPREME
COURT RULE 3.23, which was promulgated as supplemental to a
number of code provisions including MO. REV. STAT. §
512.160(1) (1949). It will be observed that questions of juris-
diction over the subject matter and of the sufficiency of the
pleadings to state a claim or defense can be raised in the appel-
late court without having been preserved in a motion for a new
trial. This is but a transition from the old concept that such
questions appeared on the face of the record proper, and were
not matters of exception in connection with errors occurring
at the trial. Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter neces-
sarily vitiates the entire proceeding; and the question of such
lack of jurisdiction may consequently be taken advantage of at
any time or stage of the proceedings, either in the trial or the
appellate court. So also with the question of a petition which
wholly and completely fails to state a cause of action or claim
upon which relief can be granted, and which could therefore
have invested the court with no jurisdiction to grant relief in
the particular instance, although the court might have complete
jurisdiction over the general class of cases to which the non-
existent case would nominally belong. Now to these two familiar
exceptions has been added an important third-the question of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment in cases
tried upon facts without a jury as provided by Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 510.310 (1949).
But apart from any requirement that allegations of error, in
order to be preserved for appellate review, shall be set up as
grounds of the motion for a new trial, it is also necessary that
the party who charges error in connection with any particular
action of the court shall, at the time the ruling or order of the
court was sought, have made known to the court the action
which he desired the court to take or his objection to the court's
action and his grounds therefor.' There is the exception, how-
ever, that it is not necessary to state grounds for objections to
instructions; and whenever error in instructions is claimed, a
general statement in the motion for a new trial of any allega-
tions of error based thereon is sufficient. However, as for
matters other than instructions, a general statement in the mo-
tion for a new trial is only sufficient where definite objections or
1. Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.210 (1949).
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requests with specific statement of grounds were made at the
appropriate occasion during trial.2
It is to be borne in mind that the practice of saving formal
exceptions to adverse rulings of the court has been expressly
abolished, and in its stead has been substituted the procedure
referred to above. Accompanying all this has been the idea of
compelling counsel to be definite and specific in the statement of
their positions upon any given point so that the trial court
may be apprised of the actual legal question involved and be
afforded the opportunity to rule accordingly. If counsel himself
desires a particular ruling by the court, he must definitely make
known the action which he desires the court to take; and if the
action of which he complains is one that has been sought by his
adversary, he must state his objection and his grounds therefor.
But notwithstanding the policy of requiring definite objections
or requests with specific statement of grounds as a condition to
appellate review, such policy also has its exception as written in
Mo. SUPREME COURT RULE 3.27, which provides that plain errors
affecting substantial rights may, in the discretion of the court,
be none the less considered on appeal, even though not preserved
for review, where the court deems that manifest injustice, or a
miscarriage of justice, has resulted from the matters complained
of. This is a wise rule of saving grace which has been adopted,
no doubt to be but infrequently invoked, but always to stand as
a judicial declaration that the unmistakable demands of justice
are never to be thwarted because of some mere procedural
omission on the part of the one whose substantial rights have
been denied.
RIGHT OF APPEAL
The most literal compliance with the rules for preserving
matters for appellate review will, however, avail a complaining
party nothing unless a situation arises where he has the right
of appeal; and in this connection he must be ever conscious that
the right of appeal exists only as provided by statute, and that
in taking and perfecting his appeal it will be essential that he
act in obedience to whatever procedure is made mandatory.
While appeals are favored, and statutes granting the right are
to be liberally construed, the fact remains that a prospective
2. Mo. SUPREmE CouRT RuLE 3.23.
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appellant has already had his day in court, and that his right
of appeal comes to him, not as a natural, inherent, or vested
right, but only as a privilege which has been indulged him upon
the theory that it is sound policy to afford a method whereby
a defeated litigant may have his rights re-examined in a court
superior to that in which he feels that his rights have been
denied.
Under our present practice appellate review is only secured
by appeal (writs of error having been abolished); and the
statute3 which prescribes the right of appeal provides that any
party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in
any civil cause may take his appeal from any of the several
judicial acts enumerated in the statute, including an order grant-
ing a new trial and a final judgment in the case. Only these
two rulings need be specifically mentioned, since practically all
appeals are taken from one or the other of them, with appeals
from final judgments being in the vast preponderance.
It is to be noted at the outset that the right of appeal is only
accorded a party to the action, and does not embrace one not a
party who may consider that he has been aggrieved by the judg-
ment or decision of the court. For instance, a wife's attorney
in a divorce action may regard himself as very much aggrieved
by the court's denial of a motion for the allowance of an at-
torney's fee of which he would be the ultimate beneficiary, but
he cannot appeal from such an order. He is not a party to the
case; and if an appeal is to be taken, it must be by the wife, who
alone has the right to apply for such an order, and to whom
alone the court could make such an award under its power to
decree alimony pending the suit for divorce in all cases where
the same would be just.
However, even a party has no right to appeal unless he is
personally aggrieved, which, as sometimes happens, is not the
case. An executor or administrator, whose duty it is to preserve
the estate for the benefit of creditors and distributees, unques-
'tionably has the right to appeal from an order or judgment
allowing a claim against the estate which he conceives to be
either unlawful or exorbitant. But if a judgment or decision
does not affect the executor or administrator in the performance
of his duty of administering the estate, he will have no right
3. Mo. REgV. STAT. § 512.020 (1949).
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of appeal, as in the case of a judgment which merely determines
the rights of beneficiaries as between themselves.
Where a party, voluntarily, and with knowledge of all the
material facts, accepts the benefits of an order or judgment, he
cannot, as a usual thing, be heard to say that he is aggrieved
by such order or judgment and be permitted to prosecute an
appeal to reverse it. However, his acceptance of an amount to
which he is entitled in any event, or about which there is no
controversy, will not bar his right to appeal from the order or
judgment directing its payment. In other words, whenever it is
possible for a party to obtain a more favorable judgment by
appealing, without assuming the risk of a less favorable judg-
ment as a consequence of his appeal, his acceptance of what the
judgment gives him will not be inconsistent with an appeal
which is taken for the purpose of securing the more advan-
tageous decision.
In the practical taking of appeals the difficulty encountered
is not so much with any question of the status of the appellant
as a party aggrieved by the judgment or decision of the court
as it is with the question of whether the judgment is final both
as to scope and as to time.
It is enough to say, generally speaking, that to be final as to
scope, the judgment must dispose of all the issues as to all the
parties and leave nothing for future determination. Within this
category is a dismissal of a cause with prejudice, which, by force
of statute operates as an adjudication upon the merits.4 Under
the new code any involuntary dismissal other than for lack of
jurisdiction or improper venue is a dismissal with prejudice un-
less the court in its order specifies otherwise.
The question of the finality of judgments for the purpose of
ascertaining the time within which an appeal must be taken is
covered by Mo. SUPREME COURT RULE 3.24, which was enacted
as supplemental to a number of code provisions.
Judgment is entered as of the day of the verdict; and except
for the intervention of other circumstances it becomes final at
the expiration of thirty days after its entry. However, the
timely filing of a motion for a new trial may either accelerate
or postpone the date of its finality. When a motion for a new
trial is filed, the judgment becomes final if and when the motion
4. Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.150 (1949).
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for a new trial is overruled, whether before or after the expira-
tion of the period of thirty days, which takes the place of the
former judgment term, and marks the period during which the
court retains the judgment in its breast, and may amend or
modify it, or grant a new trial of its own initiative unless the
transcript has been meanwhile filed in the appellate court. Even
in the character of case (as a workmen's compensation case)
where a motion for a new trial has no function to perform
other than to seek relief in the trial court, the filing and disposi-
tion of such a motion nevertheless has the same effect in fixing
the time for appeal as in the general run of cases where a motion
for a new trial is necessary to preserve allegations of error for
appellate review. All doubt and uncertainty upon this question
was once and for all removed by the Missouri Supreme Court by
its opinion in Seabaugh's Dependents v. Garver Lumber Mfg. Co.-
It is provided that for an appeal to be effective, the notice
of appeal must be filed not later than ten days after the judg-
ment or order appealed from becomes final.6 This is the ordinary
appeal, or appeal that a party may take as a matter of right
whenever an appeal is permitted by law and he exercises his
right within the time prescribed. Construing the new code, the
Missouri Supreme Court has held that the timely filing of the
notice of appeal is jurisdictional, and is the only requirement
necessary to make the appeal effective. Technical adherence to
required formal averments of the notice of appeal is not juris-
dictional; and any irregularity in the form or contents of the
notice will not serve to defeat the appeal where the notice can
reasonably be construed as an attempt in good faith to appeal
from a final judgment or appealable order.7 There is in addition
the appeal by special order of the appellate court, which the
appellant may be permitted to take within six months from the
date of final judgment, where the time prescribed for filing the
ordinary notice of appeal has expired, and the appellant is able
to show the appellate court that his delay was not due to culpable
negligence.
It is therefore to be seen that where no motion for a new trial
is filed, the ten days for giving notice of appeal begins to run
upon the expiration of thirty days after the entry of judgment.
5. 355 Mo. 1153, 200 S.W.2d 55 (1947).
6. Mo. REv. STAT. § 512.050 (1949).
7. Weller v. Hayes Truck Lines, 355 Mo. 695, 197 S.W.2d 657 (1946).
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During the period of thirty days the court retains the judgment
in its breast, as has already been pointed out; and any appeal
which is undertaken before the expiration of that period is.
consequently premature. But where a motion for a new trial is.
filed and overruled, the judgment becomes final upon the entry
of the order overruling the motion, whether before or after the
expiration of the thirty days; and the ten days for giving notice
of appeal begins to run from the date of the entry of the order.
There is, however, this exception, that if the motion for a new
trial is not passed on within ninety days after the motion is
fied, it is deemed denied for all purposes.8 This provision was
written into the code to insure that the finality of judgments
would be delayed beyond what was evidently thought to be the
maximum of time that a trial court would need to act advisedly
upon any motion for a new trial that might be pending before
it. If the court does not act upon the motion within ninety days,
then upon the expiration of that period the motion stands
arbitrarily overruled by force of statute, and the right of appeal
immediately accrues and must be exercised within ten days
thereafter.
Regardless of the salutary purpose to be accomplished by the
provision of the code that a motion for a new trial not passed
on within ninety days shall be deemed denied for all purposes,
experience shortly revealed uncertainties which were likely not
anticipated at the time of its enactment, and for which no
explicit directions were given. For instance, in the case of
grounds of the motion calling for the exercise of the trial court's
discretion, there is no true basis upon which the appellate court
may take the trial court's discretion into account when the
record discloses that such discretion had not been exercised one
way or the other.
However, a far more serious problem was presented in con-
nection with the continued exercise of the long established prac-
tice of requiring a remittitur as a condition to the overruling
of a motion for a new trial where the only error found to exist
was the return of an excessive verdict.
Under the language of the statute the trial court of course has
ninety days within which to pass on the motion for a new trial.
When the court orders a remittitur, a period of days, usually ten
8. Mlo. REv. STAT. § 510.360 (1949).
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in number, is given within which the plaintiff may elect whether
to remit and have final judgment stand for the remainder of his
verdict, or whether to refuse to remit and have the motion for a
new trial sustained. Until he does exercise his election, it
obviously cannot be known what the ultimate result will be.
But suppose the court, although entering its alternative order
within ninety days, does so at a time after eighty days, so that
the period within which the plaintiff may exercise his election
will extend beyond the expiration of ninety days. If the plaintiff
neglects to remit until after the expiration of the ninety days,
what is the consequence? In other words, is any order of the
court a nullity in so far as it may undertake to postpone final
disposition of a motion for a new trial beyond the expiration
of ninety days? If so, the motion would then be deemed over-
ruled at the expiration of ninety days, and the judgment for the
full amount of the verdict would become final and appealable
as of that date, notwithstanding the alternative order of the
court. On the other hand, if such an order is not a nullity, then
there would be no right of appeal until the plaintiff had either
exercised his election or the time for the exercise of his election
had expired, whereupon, depending upon which of the two
alternatives had come to pass, it would either be the right of the
defendant to appeal from the reduced judgment, or the right of
the plaintiff to appeal from the order sustaining the motion for
a new trial.
The Missouri Supreme Court eventually settled the question
in the landmark case of Steuernagel v. St. Louis Public Service
Co.9 It held that such an order entered before the expiration
of ninety days must be construed as having the effect of then
granting the defendant a new trial on the ground of excessive
verdict, with the option given plaintiff to retain part of his
judgment by remitting so much as was excessive. In that view
of the matter the motion is passed on within the ninety-day
period; and all that remains to be done after the expiration of
such period is the making of an entry to show which alternative
has come to pass after the plaintiff has made his choice. With
the motion thus expressly passed on by the court within ninety
days, there is no room for application of the statutory provi-
9. 238 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. 1951).
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sion that a motion not passed on within ninety days shall be
deemed denied for all purposes.
But even though the motion is passed on within the contempla-
tion of the statute by the entry of the court's alternative order,
the judgment nevertheless does not become final until complete
disposition of the motion.0 In the usual case the motion is both
passed on and disposed of concurrently. But not so in a situa-
tion where the court has ordered a remittitur as a condition to
the overruling of a motion for a new trial. In such event the
motion cannot be ultimately disposed of until the plaintiff has
either exercised his election or the time for the exercise of his
election has expired. It is then when the right of appeal accrues,
and notice of appeal must be given within ten days thereafter.
BURDEN ON APPEAL
It is ordinarily to be presumed that the judgment or decision
of a lower court is correct. Nevertheless, the presumption thus
arising adds nothing in support of the judgment or decision
when the same is subjected to the review of the appellate court.
On the contrary, the presumption is a mere rebuttable procedural
presumption which imposes the burden of showing error upon
the shoulders of the party who claimed that error was com-
mitted.
However an exception may arise in connection with an order
sustaining a motion for new trial. It is provided that every
order allowing a new trial shall specify of record the ground
or grounds upon which the new trial is granted.1 Occasionally
a trial court grants a new trial without specifying any ground
whatever for its action; and more frequently, it states its ground
in such a general way as not to satisfy the statute.
For instance, it is not enough that the motion may be sustained
upon the broad ground that the court erred in admitting in-
competent, irrelevant, and immaterial evidence. In like fashion
the statutory requirement is not observed when the motion is
sustained upon the mere ground that the court erred in giving
erroneous, prejudicial, and misleading instructions. In neither
event would such a stated ground be sufficiently definite to
10. Mo. REv. STAT. § 510.340 (1949).
11. Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 510.330 (1949).
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furnish any information to the parties or the court concerning
the real basis of the court's action.
To remedy such a situation it is provided by Mo. SUPREME
COuRT RuLE 1.10 that when a trial court grants a new trial
without specifying the ground or grounds upon which the new
trial is granted, the presumption shall be, not that the court's
action was correct, but that it was erroneous, and the burden
of supporting such action shall be placed on the respondent,
provided the appellant serves on the respondent a statement
making such allegation of error on or before the time required
for filing the transcript on appeal.
A still further situation sometimes comes about in which the
nominal respondent has the burden of showing error as to
particular matters to be considered by the appellate court.
Within ten days after the return of a verdict, a party who has
previously moved for a directed verdict may move to have the
verdict and judgment entered on it set aside, and to have judg-
ment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed
verdict. Such a motion may be joined with a motion for a new
trial, or a new trial be prayed for in the alternative.
When a motion for judgment is filed along with a motion
for a new trial and with a prayer for relief in the alternative,
the trial court, if it sustains the motion for judgment, should
also pass on the motion for a new trial, making its ruling in the
alternative, and specifying the ground or grounds for its action.
The difficulty arises where, upon the return of a verdict for
the plaintiff, the defendant moves for judgment in accordance
with his motion for a directed verdict or in the alternative for
a new trial, and the court sustains his motion for judgment but
overrules his motion for a new trial. The plaintiff thereupon
takes and perfects his appeal, to which the defendant is re-
spondent. If the appellate court reverses the judgment for the
defendant, what of its opportunity to review the matters as-
signed as error in the motion for a new trial?
In this situation the Missouri Supreme Court has held that
the defendant, while resisting the plaintiff's appeal from the
final judgment in the defendant's favor, may at the same time
allege error in instructions or other procedural matters raised
in his motion for a new trial. 12 This rests upon the theory that
12. Hughes v. St. Louis Nat. League Baseball Club, 359 Mo. 993, 224
S.W.2d 989 (1949).
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the appellate court, once invested with jurisdiction, is entitled
to consider everything preserved in the record to determine
the proper disposition of the case.
WHEN APPELLATE COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION
The filing of the transcript on appeal transfers the case to
the appellate court and for the first time invests the appellate
court with full jurisdiction over the case. Short of that time
the appellate court's authority is limited to certain special
powers conferred by statute or rule of the Supreme Court, such
as the power to grant an extension of time to file the transcript
beyond six months, or to dismiss the appeal upon the failure
of the appellant, after giving notice of appeal, to take any of
the further steps to secure the review of the judgment or order
appealed from.
It is true that when notice of appeal is filed, the clerk of the
trial court thereupon mails a copy of the same to the clerk of
the appellate court together with the docket fee deposited by the
appellant without which there is no valid filing of the notice
of appeal. However, the effect of such notice is not to transfer
the case to the appellate court, but only to give it notice that the
case may be transferred to it in the future.
It is the appellant's obligation to cause the transcript to be
prepared and filed with the clerk of the appellate court. If the
transcript is not or cannot be prepared within the initial period
of ninety days, the trial court has authority to extend the time
for a period not to exceed six months, after which the power to
grant a further extension of time is vested solely in the appellate
court. Where application for an extension of time is not made
until after the expiration of the period originally prescribed or
as extended by a previous order, it can only be granted upon a
showing of excusable neglect.
It is obviously impossible within the proper limits of an
article such as this to cover the whole field of appellate practice
and procedure. At first blush it may seem strange to terminate
the discussion of the subject at the point where the case is merely
transferred to the appellate court without going on to elaborate
upon the filing of briefs, the argument and submission, and the
like. However this has been done designedly and with the idea,
confirmed by observation and experience, that where the treat-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ment of the subject may be curtailed, the interest of the lawyer
is best served by seeing to it that he is made acquainted with
the steps he must take preliminary to the actual transfer of his
case to the appellate court. In other words, it is of no benefit
to him to have his appeal reach the appellate court unless it
comes there in such a way that the court will be in a position
to review the merits of the matters of which he complains. Once
the case is transferred, the appellate court is then in a position
to see for itself that proper procedure is followed and that the
rights of all parties are fully protected. All reference to motions
for rehearing has been purposely omitted upon the assumption
that any lawyer reading the article would hardly be expected
to give serious attention to a suggestion that he might ever have
need for recourse to such a remedy.
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